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1. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
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shall enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."' When the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington in
2004, it established a new standard for assessing the scope of this
right and determining when hearsay is admissible as trial evidence
against a criminal defendant.2 Rather than basing decisions regarding
a defendant's right to confrontation on a judicial inquiry into the
reliability of a particular statement, an approach typified by the
Court's earlier decision of Ohio v. Roberts,3 the Crawford Court
decided that all "testimonial" statements required confrontation at
trial, with two exceptions: (1) when the accused has an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant at a prior proceeding, and (2) for hearsay
exceptions in existence at the time of founding, namely the dying
declaration exception.4 Although the Court made "testimonial" the
touchstone for assessing hearsay statements in relation to the
Confrontation Clause, it failed to define this term.5 Instead, the Court
relied on a few vague descriptions of "testimonial" statements,
asserting that such statements were made in a context that would
lead to the reasonable belief that the government would use the
statements in a later criminal prosecution.6
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Crawford, lower
courts have struggled to apply the new "testimonial" test, leading to
divergent case law on a number of common hearsay situations. The
Court has already revisited the issue multiple times in cases such as
Davis v. Washington7 and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.8 These
cases, however, did little to resolve the confusion that still exists in
the lower courts on a number of issues. Worse still, the cases arguably
created even more confusion than existed before. For instance, dictum
in Melendez-Diaz suggested that a certified statement used to prove
the absence of a public record and thereby the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of a matter, which is the common exception to the
hearsay rule addressed in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10),9 is
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
3. 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980).
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-56, 56 n.6.
5. Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
'testimonial.' ").
6. Id. at 52.
7. 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006) (addressing the nontestimonial nature of statements made to
police during an existing emergency situation).
8. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009) (addressing the testimonial nature of technicians' lab
reports used to prove a substance as contraband).
9. FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
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testimonial in nature and therefore requires confrontation at trial. 10
This dictum is directly contrary to settled practice even after
Crawford, which allowed these sorts of certified statements, although
they were hearsay, to be admitted as evidence at trial without
confrontation of the declarant.11
The Melendez-Diaz dictum, if followed by lower courts, will
have wide-ranging implications due to the great number of cases it
will affect. Prosecutors use certificates of nonexistence of public record
any time they need to prove that a defendant did not do some act that
is normally memorialized in a public records database. The idea is
that the absence of a record in the database proves that the defendant
did not, in fact, perform the act. A simple example of the use of a
certificate of nonexistence of public record is the prosecution of the
offense of driving without a driver's license. The attorney prosecuting
such a case would request that a clerk at the state office that keeps
driver's license records search the records to determine if the
defendant had a proper driver's license at the time of the offense. If
the defendant did have a driver's license at that time, the clerk would
discover a record of the defendant applying to receive a license and
passing any requisite tests. But if the defendant did not have a
driver's license, the clerk would not discover the record. And because
the office keeps records of all people who do in fact have driver's
licenses, the fact that no record exists for the defendant indicates that
the defendant did not have a driver's license. The prosecutor would
then use the clerk's certificate of nonexistence of public record, or in
other words, a statement attesting to the fact that the clerk searched
the database that tracks the issuance of driver's licenses and did not
find a record for the defendant, to prove that the defendant did not
have a driver's license.
Although the offense of driving without a proper driver's
license is arguably quite trivial and mundane, prosecutors rely on
certificates of nonexistence of public record in proving many more
serious crimes. For example, in federal prosecutions, the government
uses this kind of evidence to establish violations of firearms laws by
proving that the firearm in question was not properly registered,
meaning that the defendant was not authorized to possess it.12
10. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2009).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 44-50.
12. E.g., United States v. Giambro, 544 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (certificate of
nonexistence of public record used to show failure to register firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d) (2006)); United States v. Vance, 216 F. App'x 360, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2007) (certificate of
nonexistence of public record used to establish absence of rights restoration in felon in possession
of a firearm case, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
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Additionally, in immigration cases, the United States uses this
evidence to prove illegal entry into the country by showing that the
defendant did not have proper authorization to enter the United
States. 13 These two categories of cases alone represent a hefty portion
of the federal criminal docket. Between October 2005 and September
2006, a weapons offense was the most serious charge against a
criminal defendant in 9,207 cases.14 For immigration offenses, the
number rises to 17,237.15 These two categories of cases, which do not
include the many cases in which weapons or immigration offenses
were not the most serious charge against the defendant, accounted for
a staggering 30.2 percent of the entire federal criminal docket.16 In
addition to affecting prosecutors' ability to prove these crimes, the
dictum in Melendez-Diaz would result in a huge imposition on
government records custodians. Classifying certificates of
nonexistence of public record as testimonial would require a custodian
who performed a fruitless record search to testify at trial in order to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. This would necessitate that these
custodians be in court on a regular basis in order to testify for every
one of these cases that goes to trial. In short, this dictum has the
potential to significantly affect thousands of federal criminal cases and
countless state trials throughout the country every year. 17
This Note argues that certificates of nonexistence of public
record should be considered nontestimonial evidence under Crawford
but that criminal defendants should still be able to cross-examine
records clerks under circumstances casting doubt on the reliability of
such certificates. Part II traces the shift in the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and then explains the interests protected by this
Clause. Part III analyzes certified statements of nonexistence of public
record according to the Court's slim precedent on its new "testimonial"
13. E.g., United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 146 F. App'x. 180, 180 (9th Cir. 2005) (certificate
of nonexistence of public record used to prove that defendant charged with illegal reentry after
deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 did not seek permission from Attorney General); United
States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830-34 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v.
Mendoza-Orellana, 133 F. App'x. 68, 70 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (certificate of nonexistence
of public record used to prove the illegal alien status of individuals the defendant transported
within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v. Rueda-
Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (certificate of nonexistence of public record
used to prove that defendant charged with illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326
did not seek permission from Attorney General).




17. Of course not every one of these cases would go to trial or rely on certificates of
nonexistence of public record, but they are undoubtedly common in these contexts.
[Vol. 63:6:17931796
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test and to the risks they pose to a criminal defendant's right of
confrontation. Part III.A examines the similarities between such
certificates and business records, as well as certificates of
authenticity, and considers the public policy ramifications of the
Melendez-Diaz dictum. Part III.B demonstrates that admitting
certificates of nonexistence of public record without confrontation does
not threaten the interests protected by the Confrontation Clause and
that classifying certificates of nonexistence of public record as
testimonial does not further these interests. Finally, Part IV advocates
a solution that would provide for the cross-examination of records
clerks when there is reason to doubt the certificate's reliability, either
by applying the Roberts reliability test to nontestimonial hearsay or
through a statutory framework creating procedural rules for these
certificates.
II. BACKGROUND: REPLACING "RELIABLE" WITH "TESTIMONIAL"
Crawford constituted a sea change in Confrontation Clause
analysis, altering the inquiry courts had applied for years. This Part
considers this shift, examining the previous reliability test under Ohio
v. Roberts, the Crawford testimonial test, and the continuing
development of the Crawford rule in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
Additionally, this Part introduces the interests that the Confrontation
Clause protects after Crawford cast the right to confrontation as a
procedural right to cross-examine a witness.
A. Recent Evolution of the Confrontation Clause
1. Ohio v. Roberts: Connecting the Confrontation Clause to the
Hearsay Rule of Reliability
Before Crawford, the leading Supreme Court precedent on the
Confrontation Clause was Ohio v. Roberts. Roberts addressed the issue
of whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation
right had been violated when the testimony of a witness taken at a
preliminary hearing was admitted against the defendant at trial, and
when the same witness did not testify at trial.18 In holding that no
violation of the Confrontation Clause occurred, the Court interpreted
the Clause as simply a preference for live testimony at trial so that the
defendant could test the reliability and trustworthiness of the
18. 448 U.S. 56, 58 (1980).
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testimony through cross-examination. 19 Despite the general rule
requiring live testimony, the Court acknowledged exceptions for
situations in which both the witness was unavailable at trial and the
prior testimony presented sufficient "indicia of reliability."20
In the process, the Roberts Court entwined the Sixth
Amendment's confrontation right with hearsay law.2 1 The Court
acknowledged that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, the need
to ensure sufficient reliability of testimony in the absence of an ability
to cross-examine a declarant, also underlies the many exceptions to
the hearsay rule. 22 Finally, the Court ruled that the satisfaction of
most exceptions to the hearsay rule also constituted the satisfaction of
the confrontation right.23 In Roberts, the preliminary hearing
testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability because it complied with
the hearsay exception for prior testimony. 24 Therefore, the testimony
was held admissible at the later trial because its admission did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.25
Applying the Roberts reliability test before Crawford, lower
courts routinely found certificates of nonexistence of public record
admissible without confrontation at trial. Essentially, as long as the
certificate satisfied the hearsay exception for the absence of public
record or entry, contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10), then it
would bear sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be admissible without
violating the Confrontation Clause. For example, in United States v.
Regner, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's Confrontation
Clause challenge to the admission of a certificate of nonexistence of
public record. 26 Because the certificate met the requirements of the
hearsay exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) and
because the defendant could not show any reason to doubt the
reliability of the certificate, the court found no Confrontation Clause
violation.27
19. Id. at 65.
20. Id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
21. Id. at 64-66; see also 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 252, at
158 (6th ed. 2006) ("In ... Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court created an extremely close linkage
between hearsay exceptions and statements that satisfy the Confrontation Clause.").
22. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
23. Id. at 66.
24. Id. at 72-73.
25. Id.
26. 677 F.2d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. Id.; see also United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a
Confrontation Clause challenge to admission of certificate of nonexistence of public record in
context of weapons registration, relying on Roberts' reliability test); United States v. Metzger,
778 F.2d 1195, 1200-02 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986) (similar).
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2. Crawford v. Washington: Creating the Testimonial Test
In 2004, the Supreme Court's holding in Crawford v.
Washington disconnected the Confrontation Clause from hearsay
law. 2 8 In Crawford, the Court considered whether a wife's statement
to a police officer investigating her husband's alleged criminal act was
admissible at trial when the wife was unavailable to testify due to the
marital privilege.29 The lower court applied the Roberts test and found
that the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability for admission
without confrontation. 3 0 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the admission of this statement at trial without an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant was a violation of the Confrontation
Clause.31 In doing so, the Court reformulated the standard for
assessing a defendant's right to confrontation.
The Court found that the Confrontation Clause was motivated
not merely by a desire to ensure the reliability of testimony, but also
by the founders' distrust of ex parte proceedings that collected
evidence against the accused for use during prosecution. 32 Under this
interpretation, the Court asserted that the only means of testing the
reliability of a statement was cross-examination. 3 3 Thus, fulfilling the
requirements of a hearsay exception alone would no longer satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. 34 The Court explained that this right to
confrontation, and therefore cross-examination, applies to
"testimonial" statements. 35 The Crawford Court recognized only two
exceptions: (1) when the witness is unavailable at trial and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witneSS36 and
(2) for statements that, although testimonial, qualified under
founding-era exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, namely dying
declarations. 37
28. 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence.").
29. Id. at 40. As the Court explains, the marital privilege generally prevents one spouse
from testifying without the other's consent. Id.
30. Id. at 38.
31. Id. at 68-69.
32. Id. at 50-53.
33. Id. at 68-69 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability




36. Id. at 53-56.
37. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court singles out the dying declarations exception as "[t]he one
deviation we have found" from the rule and historical practice that testimonial evidence is not
2010] 1799
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Despite creating a new standard for assessing the admissibility
of out-of-court statements, the Court's opinion did little to clarify what
exactly constitutes a "testimonial" statement. Although it purposefully
chose to elaborate the term through later cases rather than explicitly
defining the term,38 the Court did provide some general descriptions of
testimonial statements. Essentially, a testimonial statement is one
"made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,"39
including "ex parte in court testimony or its functional equivalent."40
The Court described a "core class" of testimonial statements that the
declarant reasonably would expect to be used at trial: " 'extrajudicial
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' "41
Importantly, the Court placed nontestimonial hearsay outside the
scope of the Confrontation Clause, expressly leaving such evidence as
business records and statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy
to be governed instead by hearsay and evidence law.4 2 The Court
avoided overruling Roberts outright and suggested that it still may
have some application in these other contexts. 43
After Crawford established this new testimonial test, lower
courts still routinely found certificates of nonexistence of public record
to be admissible without confrontation at trial. For example, multiple
circuits have ruled that certificates of nonexistence of public record
are admissible without confrontation, primarily in cases involving the
unlawful possession of firearmS44 or illegal aliens, 45 which together
constitute a substantial number of cases nationwide.46 These courts
admissible without confrontation. Id. As such, it seems unlikely that any other hearsay
exceptions could bypass the requirements of Crawford based on a founding era practice.
38. Id. at 68 (Acknowledging the confusion that was to result in the lower courts without
more guidance, the Court nevertheless declared, "We leave for another day any effort to spell out
a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' ")
39. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
42. Id. at 56.
43. Id. at 68 ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny altogether.").
44. See cases cited supra note 12.
45. See cases cited supra note 13.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. Certificates of nonexistence of public record
are commonly used in other scenarios as well. See, e.g., United States v. Sandles, 469 F.3d 508,
511 (6th Cir. 2006) (FDIC affidavit in bank robbery prosecution that bank's insured status had
not been terminated based on nonexistence of public record).
1800 [Vol. 63:6:1793
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have held that certificates of nonexistence of public record were not
testimonial, and therefore did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
In Millard v. United States, for instance, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld the admission at trial of certificates of
nonexistence of public record used to prove that the defendant did not
have a license to carry a firearm and that the defendant possessed an
unregistered firearm. 47 Even though the defendant had no opportunity
to confront the records clerk at trial, the court found the certificates to
be nontestimonial because they were not a substitute for live
testimony at trial.48 Instead, the certificates of nonexistence of public
record were merely a substitute "for carting in the entire set of
[government] files memorializing the issuance of firearm registration
certificates and licenses, so that the jury could determine whether a
registration certificate and license had been issued in [the defendant]'s
name."49 Because the certificates were not testimonial, their
admission at trial without an opportunity to confront the records clerk
did not violate the Confrontation Clause.50
3. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Implications for Certificates of
Nonexistence of Public Record
As the Crawford opinion anticipated,5 1 lower courts have
struggled to apply the new testimonial standard, forcing the Supreme
Court to revisit the standard and the scope of the Confrontation
Clause multiple times since Crawford was decided in 2004.52 Most
recently, the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, which
addressed whether a chemist's sworn certificate of analysis finding a
substance to be contraband was a testimonial statement requiring
47. 967 A.2d 155, 161-62 (D.C. 2009).
48. Id. at 162.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Provencio-Sandoval, 272 F. App'x 683, 685 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Urqhart, 469 F.3d
745, 749 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Salazar-Gonzalez, 458 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 825 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mendoza-
Orellana, 133 F. App'x 68, 70 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680
(5th Cir. 2005). Many state courts also ruled certificates of nonexistence of public record to be
nontestimonial after Crawford. See, e.g., Dickens v. Commonwealth, 663 S.E.2d 548, 550 (Va.
2008) (certification of failure to register as a sex offender); Michels v. Commonwealth, 624 S.E.2d
675, 676 (Va. 2006) (certifications of no record of license to operate as an LLC); State v.
Kirkpatrick, 161 P.3d 990, 991 (Wash. 2007) (certification of no record of driver's license).
51. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004) ("We acknowledge ... that our
refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim uncertainty.")
52. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct.
2858 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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confrontation at trial when the analyst was available for trial and the
defendant had no prior opportunity for cross-examination. 5 3 A bare
five-member majority of the Court held that confrontation is required,
as the chemist's sworn certificate is no different from Crawford's
affidavit example, which is "incontrovertibly a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact."54
In so holding, the Court rejected the government's attempt to
distinguish the chemist's certificate from other, more clearly
testimonial statements. The government argued, for example, that the
chemist's certificate was analogous to a public or business record and
therefore was not testimonial.55 The Court rejected this argument on
the ground that the certificates were "'calculated for use essentially in
the court, not in the business,'" to prove a fact against the
defendant.56 As in Crawford, the Court held that mere satisfaction of a
hearsay exception would not, by itself, satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. According to the majority, even if the certificates were
documents that were kept in the regular course of business and
therefore qualified for the hearsay exception for business records
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), because the certificate was
testimonial (created for "the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact at trial" instead of for "the administration of an entity's affairs,"
as are most business records), it fell within the scope of the
Confrontation Clause.57
In further discussion, the Court considered any document
prepared for use at trial to be testimonial, with perhaps one narrow
exception pointed out by the dissent: a clerk's certificate
authenticating an official record to be used as evidence would be
admissible at trial without confrontation of the clerk.5 8 In other words,
a record is admissible if a records clerk attaches a certified statement
to the record declaring it to be authentic. However, if the clerk were to
interpret a record in some way or create a record for the sole purpose
of providing evidence against the defendant, similar to what the
laboratory chemist in Melendez-Diaz did in a certified analysis of the
contraband, then the statement would be testimonial and would
require confrontation.5 9 In dictum, the Court elaborated on this
53. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
54. Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 2538.
56. Id. (quoting Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)).
57. Id. at 2539-40.
58. Id. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2538-39 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 63:6:17931802
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reasoning by considering the common situation of a clerk who
searches for a particular record relevant to a defendant's guilt or
innocence, fails to find the record, and then creates a certified
statement attesting to its nonexistence.60 This, the Court suggested,
would be a testimonial statement because it was prepared for trial and
"would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose
guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk
searched." 61 Therefore, even if the clerk's certificate of nonexistence of
public record were to qualify for a hearsay exception to the rules of
evidence, it would nevertheless require confrontation at trial, unlike a
clerk's certificate of authenticity of a record. 62
The distinction between a clerk's certificate of authenticity and
certificate of nonexistence of public record is directly contrary to lower
courts' practice, even after Crawford.63 However, there are early signs
that the Supreme Court will follow the Melendez-Diaz dictum
concerning the testimonial nature of a clerk's certificate of
nonexistence of public record. In United States v. Norwood, the Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment deeming nontestimonial a
clerk's certified statement that no record existed of any reported
income for the defendant.64 The Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.65 On remand, the
government conceded that the admission of the certificate was a
violation of the Confrontation Clause after Melendez-Diaz.66
Additionally, in United States v. Martinez-Rios, the Fifth Circuit
followed the Melendez-Diaz dictum to overturn prior circuit precedent
and hold that certificates of nonexistence of public record are
60. Id. at 2539.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
64. 555 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 491 (2009). The prosecution
used the certificate at trial to suggest that the large amount of cash found on the defendant at
the time of arrest was not the result of any legal activity, such as employment, but rather the
defendant's alleged drug dealing. Id. The Ninth Circuit analogized the certificate of nonexistence
of public record at issue to a business record in order to find it nontestimonial, and therefore not
a violation of the Confrontation Clause under Crawford. Id. at 1066.
65. Norwood v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 491 (2009).
66. United States v. Norwood, 595 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010). The court nevertheless
did not reverse the conviction for a new trial because the error was harmless. Id. The Ninth
Circuit later reached the same result in another case, United States v. Orozco-Acosta. 607 F.3d
1156 (9th Cir. 2010). There, the trial court admitted a certificate of nonexistence of public record
to prove that the defendant charged with illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326
did not seek permission from the Attorney General. Id. at 1159-60. On appeal, the government
conceded that the admission of the certificate of nonexistence of public record was a violation of
the Confrontation Clause, just as it did in Norwood. Id. at 1161. The Ninth Circuit again found
the error harmless. Id. at 1161-62.
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testimonial and therefore require confrontation. 6 7 The court reasoned
that such a certificate is testimonial because it is created for use at
trial and not in the ordinary course of business, unlike a business
record.68 Similarly, in Tabaka v. District of Columbia, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals also followed the Melendez-Diaz dictum to
reverse a conviction for operating a motor vehicle without a permit.
The court based its decision on a finding that the admission at trial of
a certificate of nonexistence of public record, to prove that the
defendant did not have a permit, violated the Confrontation Clause. 69
Considering the large number of criminal cases the Melendez-Diaz
dictum affects, its suggestion that certificates of nonexistence of public
record require confrontation at trial could have a substantial impact
on future criminal prosecutions. 70
B. The Interests Protected by the Confrontation Clause
Because Crawford interpreted the right guaranteed in the
Confrontation Clause to be essentially a procedural right to cross-
examine witnesses, it linked the interests protected by the
Confrontation Clause to the interests protected by in-court cross-
examination.71 These interests revolve around the truth-seeking
function of the jury trial. They include (1) the provision to the
defendant of an ability to test the truth, accuracy, and completeness of
adverse testimony, (2) the requirement that a witness be in the
presence of the defendant when he makes the statements, (3) the
requirement that the witness make the statements under oath, and (4)
67. 595 F.3d 581, 585-86 (5th Cir. 2010).
68. Id. at 586.
69. 976 A.2d 173, 175 (D.C. 2009).
70. In spite of, and perhaps because of, this large potential for drastic alteration of the
status quo, some members of the Court seemed willing to at least reconsider Melendez-Diaz-if
not overrule it-only months after it was decided. On January 11, 2009, the Court heard oral
arguments in Briscoe v. Virginia, a case that the Court granted certiorari four days after
Melendez-Diaz was decided. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009); Lyle Denniston, A Limit
on Confrontation Rights?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 8, 2010, 4:43 PM) http://www.scotusblog.
com/?p=14516. The issue was whether a state statute that provides for cross-examination by
allowing the defense to call a lab analyst, the certificate of whom the prosecution relies on as
evidence at trial, satisfies the defendant's confrontation right. Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. at 2858.
Obviously, this provided the Court with an immediate opportunity to curtail or modify its
holding in Melendez-Diaz. However, Briscoe was eventually vacated and remanded in a one-
sentence per curiam opinion. See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Briscoe.
71. BROUN ETAL., supra note 21, § 19, at 109-10.
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the provision to the jury of an opportunity to observe the witness and
assess his trustworthiness. 7 2
The ability of cross-examination to accomplish the most
important of these interests, the testing of adverse testimony, is the
reason that Professor Wigmore considered cross-examination to be
"the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."7 3
Not only does cross-examination allow the defendant to expose a bald-
faced lie as such, it also allows the defendant to tease out the
weaknesses of the testimony of a more scrupled witness. These
weaknesses commonly include problems associated with
misperception, faulty memory, and faulty narration.74
The other interests are all somewhat secondary to the interest
of testing the adverse testimony. Nevertheless, they are each
important in their own right. The requirement that the witness be in
the defendant's presence emphasizes the great importance of the
witness's testimony and the need to tell the truth, as the witness must
face the person whose life could be dramatically affected by the
testimony.75 Similarly, the requirement of the oath reminds the
witness of the formality and gravity of the proceedings, in addition to
the possibility of prosecution for perjury should the witness lie.7 6
Finally, in-court cross-examination allows the jury to better assess the
credibility of a witness by providing an opportunity to observe the
witness's demeanor during interrogation.7 7 Presumably, if a witness
became uncomfortable and fidgety when faced with cross-examination,
the jury observing the witness's demeanor would be able to draw
inferences regarding the veracity of the witness's testimony.
III. ANALYSIS: CERTIFICATES OF NONEXISTENCE OF PUBLIC RECORD
AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Following Melendez-Diaz's distinction, albeit in dictum,
between a clerk's certificate of authenticity and a clerk's certificate of
nonexistence of public record, the question becomes whether the
72. Id. § 31, at 140; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
MANUAL § 14.01 (7th ed. 2005); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1022-26 (1998); Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A
Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 573-75 (2004); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514 (2005).
73. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
74. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES
107-08 (6th ed. 2008).





underlying purposes of the Confrontation Clause support such a
distinction. This Note asserts that there is no rational distinction
between a certificate of authenticity and a certificate of nonexistence
of public record. As a result, certificates of nonexistence of public
record, just like certificates of authenticity, simply are not testimonial.
Furthermore, certificates of nonexistence of public record do not pose a
meaningful risk to the interests protected by the Confrontation
Clause. All of these interests are linked to the factfinding mission of
an adversarial jury trial, including an ability to test the truth and
accuracy of adverse testimony, to require the witness to be in the
presence of the defendant when he makes the statements, to require
the witness to make the statements under oath, and to allow the jury
an opportunity to observe the witness and to assess his
trustworthiness.78 As a nontestimonial statement, a certificate of
nonexistence of public record should not be subject to the
requirements of confrontation under the Crawford analysis.
A. Certificates of Nonexistence of Public Record Should Not Be
Considered Testimonial
Certificates of nonexistence of public record provide an
interesting lens through which to examine the testimonial standard
because, at first glance, they seem to straddle the definitional line the
Court set out in Crawford. On the one hand, they are statements
prepared in anticipation of use at trial to prove a fact against the
defendant. Thus, they seem to be a part of the "core class" of
testimonial statements the Court described in Crawford:
" 'extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.' "79 As such, they would require confrontation, as the
Melendez-Diaz majority asserted.80 As discussed in this Part, however,
certificates of nonexistence of public record are more properly
analogized to other types of evidence, such as business records and
certificates of authenticity.
Certificates of nonexistence of public record should not be
considered testimonial for several reasons. First, certificates of
nonexistence of public record are much like business records, which
are nontestimonial under Crawford."' These certificates only attest to
78. See sources cited supra note 72.
79. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 365 (1992)).
80. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2009).
81. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
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the content of a body of public records, which was created before
prosecution for reasons that had nothing to do with prosecution.
Second, certificates of nonexistence of public record are not materially
distinct from certificates of authenticity, which the Supreme Court
accepted as nontestimonial in Melendez-Diaz.82 Finally, classifying
certificates of nonexistence of public record as testimonial, and thus
requiring confrontation at trial of the clerk, would have numerous
adverse public policy effects.83
1. Comparison to Business Records
Certificates of nonexistence of public record are substantially
similar to business records, which are not testimonial and do not
implicate the Confrontation Clause.84 As Crawford and Melendez-Diaz
made clear, business records generally are not testimonial because
they are created not for the purpose of proving a fact at trial but for
some other purpose related to business activity.85 This is a result of
the requirements of the business record hearsay exception. This
exception, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), requires the
report to be made in the "regular course of a regularly conducted
business activity" proximately to the event reported, based on
information provided by a person with knowledge of the event
reported.86 As the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence discuss, business records derive their reliability from various
sources, including "systematic checking," "regularity and continuity
82. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
83. Arguably these sorts of public policy considerations have no relevance for a
consideration of whether a statement is testimonial. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, Briscoe v.
Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191). Nevertheless, they are relevant to an evaluation
of the testimonial standard itself, as wide-ranging negative effects of classifying certain
statements as testimonial, with little countervailing benefits, suggest reasons to modify the
testimonial standard. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Justice Scalia's Fundamentally Flawed
Confrontation Clause Analysis Continues in Melendez-Diaz: It's Time to Begin All Over Again, 45
CRIM. L. BULL. 1052, 1058 (2009) ("From whatever vantage point one assumes, whether the
interests of the criminal defendant, the search for fairness in the criminal justice system,
through analysis of testimonial and hearsay risks, balancing of probative value versus trial
concerns, effectiveness of cross-examination of the in court witness testifying as to the out-of-
court statement, etc., the current state of the Confrontation Clause . . . is theoretically unsound,
inconsistent, confused, and illogical.").
84. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
85. Id.; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539-40. When, however, the business record is
created for the purpose of proving a fact in anticipated litigation, it is testimonial and requires
confrontation. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 (finding that documents kept in the regular
course of business but "calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business" do not
qualify as business documents to be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status).
86. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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which produce habits of precision," "actual experience of business in
relying upon them," and from the "duty to make an accurate record as
part of a continuing job or occupation."87 The Court seems to allow a
business record as nontestimonial evidence as long as the record was
created without any anticipation of use at trial and without the bias
that accompanies such use. This decision is only bolstered by the
general reliability of these records.
Applying this rationale for the nontestimonial nature of
business records, it is apparent that the absence of public records is
also nontestimonial and should not be subject to the requirements of
the Confrontation Clause. Perhaps most importantly, even though
certificates of nonexistence of public record are created for use at trial,
the sorts of public records databases that lend themselves to
certificates of nonexistence of public record are maintained for
purposes unrelated to proving facts at trials.88 Instead, they are
maintained for the official purpose of administering comprehensive
government policies.
Consider, for example, the two common situations in which
certificates of nonexistence of public record are used at trial: firearms
offenses and immigration offenses. Firearms records, at the federal
level, are kept in accordance with the official purpose of preventing
certain kinds of dangerous weapons from existing in the
marketplace. 89 At the state level, firearms records are often kept for
the purpose of ensuring that certain dangerous members of society do
not have access to firearms through, for instance, databases of
concealed handgun carry permits.90 Similarly, in the immigration
context, the federal government maintains records to pursue, for
example, a comprehensive immigration policy to ensure that aliens
with certain criminal convictions do not enter the United States.91
Although criminal prosecution is one means of enforcing some of these
government policies, it is by no means the only method. Nor is it the
chosen method in a sufficient number of cases to conclude that the
entire purpose for the database is to prove a fact at trial against
87. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note (citing BROUN ET AL., supra note 21, §§
281, 286-87); Charles V. Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 IOWA L. REV. 276 (1961).
88. However, when a record in the official database would be considered testimonial, so
should the certificate of nonexistence of public record. This Note's argument only applies to the
sorts of records that are not testimonial in nature by virtue of the fact that they are kept for
purposes unrelated to prosecution.
89. 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (2006).
90. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351 (2010) (requiring registration for handgun
carry permit).
91. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (requiring certain aliens to seek permission from the U.S.
Attorney General to enter the country).
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someone accused of violating these government policies. Therefore,
while the actual certificate of nonexistence of public record is, in fact,
created for the purpose of proving a fact at trial, it is based entirely on
a database of records that is kept for other purposes.
Additionally, the record databases exist prior to prosecution, or
any thought of prosecution, against a particular defendant. Unlike, for
instance, a police investigation report that is created after the
commission of a crime for the sole purpose of proving facts against a
defendant, certificates of nonexistence of public record are based on
records that were in existence before the alleged crime occurred.
Therefore, these certificates should not be subject to any suspicion of
bias that undergirds the Court's decision to consider even some
business records testimonial. 92 The database simply could not be kept
in a manner that would prejudice a particular defendant against
whom the certificate of nonexistence of public record is admitted
because the database is administered without a view to any particular
case. Additionally, the particular defendant is entirely unknown to the
clerks during the record-keeping process, making it nearly impossible
for clerks to act in a way that would prejudice the defendant, precisely
because of the lack of any record for the defendant.
In addition to the lack of anticipated use of official records at
trial and the bias accompanying it, official records exhibit the same
level of reliability, and for the same reasons, as business records. The
Advisory Committee Notes for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), which
governs the admissibility of hearsay through official records,
specifically state that the sources of reliability are the same as for
business records. 93 The Notes assert that official records may even be
more reliable than normal business records, as there is an
"assumption that a public official will perform his duty properly" and
an "unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the
record."94
Certificates of nonexistence of public record, therefore, are
analogous to business records because they are based on databases
kept for purposes unrelated to trial and are equally reliable, if not
more reliable, so as to warrant their classification as nontestimonial
and therefore outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.
92. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009) (finding that
documents kept in the regular course of business but "calculated for use essentially in the court,
not in the business" do not qualify as business documents to be admitted at trial despite hearsay
status).




2. Analogy to Certificates of Authenticity
Certificates of nonexistence of public record are also not
distinguishable for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis from
certificates of authenticity, which the Supreme Court accepted as
nontestimonial in Melendez-Diaz.95 For certificates of authenticity, the
clerk is merely "certify[ing] to the correctness of a copy of a record
kept in his office," and not "furnish[ing], as evidence for the trial of a
lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or ...
its substance or effect."96 Thus, as long as the clerk does not create a
document interpreting the record and only states that the document is
an accurate copy of the official record, the statement is not testimonial
according to the Melendez-Diaz Court.
Following this logic, no basis exists for distinguishing a
statement that a record was found and was accurate from a statement
that no record was found. Just like a certificate of authentication, a
certificate of nonexistence of public record merely confirms the
contents of the records as a whole in relation to a particular
defendant. 97 The only difference is that the latter states that no record
exists for a particular defendant, while the former states that one does
exist. A clerk, then, could evade whatever distinction the Court seems
to suggest is present here by simply attaching a blank sheet of paper
to the certificate of authenticity and declaring that the blank sheet of
paper is the authentic record that exists in the database. Surely the
Court and the Confrontation Clause would not require such a
ridiculous measure as an alternative to a simple certificate stating
that no record exists in the database.
Additionally, the distinction cannot rest on any difference in
the actual confrontation that would result in the case of a certificate of
nonexistence of public record relative to a certificate of authenticity.
The cross-examination of a clerk who did in fact retrieve a document
95. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
96. Id. at 2539 (quoting State v. Wilson, 75 So. 95, 97 (La. 1917)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97. Arguably, a certificate of authenticity states much more about the record and its
relation to the defendant than a certificate of nonexistence of public record does. For instance,
Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11), which provides for the authentication of business records
through certification, requires that the certifying custodian assert that the record is not only
authentic but also fulfills the requirements of the hearsay exception for business records (that
the record was made at the appropriate time by the appropriate person, was kept in the course of
regularly conducted activity, and was made as a regular practice). FED. R. EVID. 902(11).
Contrastingly, a certificate of nonexistence of public record asserts none of these facts.
Unconfronted certificates of nonexistence of public record, therefore, pose a less significant
threat to defendants' confrontation rights than certificates of authenticity, at least of business
records.
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(in the case of a certificate of authenticity) would be exactly the same
as the cross-examination of a clerk who failed to retrieve a document
(in the case of a certificate of nonexistence of public record). In both
cases, because the clerk is unlikely to remember the particular
circumstances of any single search,98 he could testify to nothing more
than the process by which he routinely searches for a document and
reports the result, which would be either the presence or absence of a
record. The truth-seeking process is identical in both situations.
Therefore, there is no reason under the Confrontation Clause to
require cross-examination in the one scenario but not in the other.
3. Public Policy: The Consequences of Requiring Confrontation
Requiring confrontation of certificates of nonexistence of public
record would have substantial practical implications that support
classifying them as nontestimonial. 99 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Crawford, policy
considerations support the admission of business and public records
without requiring them to be subject to confrontation."oo These same
policy considerations apply with equal force to certificates of
nonexistence of public record. Specifically, Rehnquist's opinion
mentions a desire to avoid the inconvenience and inefficiency suffered
by both the parties and the judicial system of "requir[ing] numerous
additional witnesses without any apparent gain in the truth-seeking
process."101
These negative effects, in the case of certificates of
nonexistence of public record, would largely manifest themselves by
hauling countless record-keepers into courts across the country. The
record-keepers would wait around to testify about an issue that is not
likely to be seriously disputed. Furthermore, their testimony would be
exactly the same in every case, as they would testify to nothing more
than the routine process by which they search the records database.
98. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
99. Confrontation is a procedural constitutional right that should not be denied any
defendant simply due to the cost of providing the right, especially when a statement is clearly
testimonial. Nevertheless, such public policy costs should be considered in hard questions of
whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial to begin with, as is the case with
certificates of nonexistence of public record.
100. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
101. Id. Justice Kennedy echoed these sentiments in his dissenting opinion in Melendez-
Diaz: "The Court purchases its meddling with the Confrontation Clause at a dear price, a price
not measured in taxpayer dollars alone. Guilty defendants will go free, on the most technical
grounds, as a direct result of today's decision, adding nothing to the truth-finding process." 129
S. Ct. 2527, 2550 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Not only would this waste the courts' and parties' time, it also would
disrupt the efficient functioning of government, as these record-
keepers would spend much of their time in court rather than fulfilling
their official duties. This would result in the multiplication of the
number of record-keepers needed in order to ensure that official duties
are performed despite the clerks' many court appearances.
Furthermore, the current level of records expertise that clerks
maintain would be diluted, as the task would become increasingly
decentralized. 10 2 For all these reasons, certificates of nonexistence of
public record should be considered nontestimonial statements that do
not require confrontation under the Constitution.
B. Certificates of Nonexistence of Public Record Do Not Pose a Threat
to the Interests Protected by the Confrontation Clause
The Supreme Court has interpreted the right guaranteed in
the Confrontation Clause to be essentially an opportunity to cross-
examine a witness.103 Thus, it makes sense to assess the value of
labeling a certificate of nonexistence of public record as testimonial,
and thereby the value of requiring confrontation at trial, according to
the purposes of cross-examination. These purposes of cross-
examination are linked to the role a jury trial plays as the principal
factfinding mechanism in the criminal justice system. They include (1)
the provision to the parties of an ability to test the truth and accuracy
of adverse testimony, (2) the requirement that a witness be in the
presence of the defendant when he makes the statements, (3) the
requirement that the witness make the statements under oath, and (4)
the provision to the jury of an opportunity to observe the witness and
assess his trustworthiness. 1 04 Considering each of these purposes in
turn, it becomes apparent that admitting certificates of nonexistence
of public record without confrontation does not threaten these
interests. In fact, cross-examination would add very little, if anything,
102. Other more incidental effects are possible: the defendant could have more leverage in
plea bargaining (because the government will have the additional burden and cost of bringing
the clerk to court to prove its case), and the requirement that the clerk be present to testify could
interfere with the right to a speedy trial (because coordinating the presence of one more witness
could pose scheduling delays). See Amber N. Gremillion, Note, I'll Be Seeing You in Court:
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts'Flawed Decision and Its Impact on Louisiana, 37 S.U. L. REV.
255, 273-75 (2010) (discussing the practical effects of the Melendez-Diaz holding for Louisiana
courts).
103. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 ("Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.").
104. See supra Part I.B.
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to the defendant's ability to make his case in court when a certificate
of nonexistence of public record is at issue.
First, the cross-examination of a clerk who certifies the
nonexistence of a public record would not provide a substantial
opportunity to test the truth and accuracy of the statement that the
public record does not exist. A clerk's testimony will consist of little
more than a description of the general process used to search the
records database, as the clerk is unlikely to remember the specific act
of searching the database for the particular defendant's records. As
the Tenth Circuit stated when it rejected a confrontation challenge to
the admission of a certificate of nonexistence of public record, "If the
essence of cross-examination is that the declarant's memory,
perception, bias, and narration will be tested, there is little likely
benefit from cross-examination of an inspector who was hired for his
skills and ability to perform the job of inspecting the . . . database." 05
At best, defense counsel could hope to uncover some kind of systemic
problems in the method by which the records are kept or searched.
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily require confrontation at trial
and could be discovered just as easily by requiring the clerk to include
with his certificate a description of the record-keeping and record-
searching processes.106
Second, the requirement that a witness be in the presence of
the defendant when he makes the statements is irrelevant to the
scenario in which a records clerk testifies as to what the record
contains. Typically, this requirement is important to discourage a
witness from lying or otherwise falsifying his testimony by making
sure the witness will face the defendant, who will bear whatever
negative effects arise from the witness's testimony.10 7 In light of the
fact that a clerk's testimony concerning the nonexistence of public
record concerns the clerk's official duties and nothing more, it is
highly unlikely that the clerk would either falsify his testimony or feel
reticent about discussing his record-keeping activities as a result of
seeing the defendant in the courtroom. This is also true because the
105. United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1336 (10th Cir. 1999).
106. Even if the certificate of nonexistence of public record is found to be nontestimonial,
there still could be circumstances under which the defendant would have an opportunity to cross-
examine the clerk. In cases where the certificate is dubious or otherwise unreliable, a court may
require confrontation under the Roberts test, which arguably still applies to nontestimonial
statements. See infra Part IV; see also Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After Crawford: The
Decision's Impact on How Hearsay Is Analyzed Under the Confrontation Clause, 36 SETON HALL
L. REV. 327, 415-19 (2006).
107. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 72, § 14.01.
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clerk is not likely to know the defendant on a personal level outside of
the context of the criminal proceeding.
Third, requiring a witness to make his statement under oath
adds little support for classifying a certificate of nonexistence of public
record as testimonial. The oath requirement, much like the
requirement that the witness see the defendant in court while he
testifies, is designed to emphasize for the witness the formality of the
proceeding and the gravity of the outcome for the parties.108 Again,
this will not have much influence on a records clerk because he will
only testify to his official activities in regard to the records database,
with little chance for manipulation of the truth. Furthermore, the
certification process fulfills the same function as the oath because it
requires the records clerk to formally declare that no record was
found, similarly impressing upon the clerk the importance of the
statement.
Fourth, compelling confrontation in order to allow the jury an
opportunity to observe the clerk and to assess his trustworthiness
does not support classifying certificates of nonexistence of public
record as testimonial. This purpose of cross-examination is linked to
the function of the jury as the ultimate fact-finder in a trial. The jury
must choose which facts to believe, which is necessarily related to its
determination of the credibility of the person who relates those
facts. 109 By virtue of a clerk's office alone, the jury is likely to afford a
clerk's testimony such credibility that it would not be influenced by an
opportunity to view him. Additionally, the clerk would be testifying to
facts that involve no interpretations or inferences, so his credibility is
not likely to be a real issue at trial.
IV. SOLUTION: REINING IN THE TESTIMONIAL TEST
At least two alternative solutions for dealing with certificates
of nonexistence of public record are possible while still accommodating
the Melendez-Diaz Court's concerns for these statements. First, if
certificates of nonexistence of public record are classified as
nontestimonial, they could still be subject to Roberts reliability review,
which would provide defendants who want to challenge the certificates
a means of presenting that challenge to the court. Second, statutory
procedural rules could allow the defendant to call the clerk as a
witness in his own case or to require the prosecution to call the clerk
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clerk. Both of these solutions accommodate the concern the Court
expressed in Melendez-Diaz that clerks' statements would be entirely
untested, while at the same time avoiding the significant negative
effects that would result from classifying certificates of nonexistence of
public record as testimonial and requiring the clerk to testify at every
trial.
The easiest and best solution is to classify certificates of
nonexistence of public record as nontestimonial and to continue
applying the Roberts reliability test to such certificates. Crawford
avoided overruling Roberts outright, and the majority opinion even
suggested that Roberts may continue to apply to nontestimonial
hearsay, declaring, "Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is
wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States
flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and
as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether."110 Some state courts have
read this language as an open door to allow all nontestimonial
statements, regardless of whether they satisfy the Roberts reliability
test.111
This approach, which some states have at least flirted with
adopting, 112  provides some Confrontation Clause protection,
compelling the prosecution to produce the witness in those cases
where confrontation is most necessary, that is, when the hearsay
statement is potentially unreliable. This ensures that defendants are
110. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see also Latimer, supra note 106, at
415-16. Crawford left open whether the Confrontation Clause applies at all to nontestimonial
statements. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 72, § 14.03[4]. The Court resolved this
question in Davis v. Washington, where it made clear that the Confrontation Clause only applies
to testimonial statements. 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) ("It is the testimonial character of the
statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon
hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause."). So if Roberts were to continue to
apply to nontestimonial statements, it would do so not because the Confrontation Clause also
applies to nontestimonial statements but rather because the Roberts reliability test is a means of
assessing reliability under general hearsay and evidence law.
111. Latimer, supra note 106, at 418 n.461.
112. The Tennessee Supreme Court, for example, adopted this approach after Crawford in
the case State v. Maclin. 183 S.W.3d 335, 351 (Tenn. 2006) ("If the statement is nontestimonial,
the Confrontation Clause analysis does not end. Instead, consistent with Ohio v. Roberts, the
court must determine whether the out-of-court statement bears adequate indicia of
reliability. . . ." (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (stating that "[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is
at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framer's design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law-as does Roberts"))). Tennessee turned its back on this approach,
however, when Davis v. Washington exempted nontestimonial hearsay from Confrontation
Clause analysis entirely. See State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Tenn. 2007) ("[Tlhe ruling in
Davis that the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to nontestimonial hearsay conflicts with our
interpretation in Maclin that the Roberts test should be used to determine the admissibility of
nontestimonial hearsay.").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
able to press the court for confrontation when they have reason to
question the reliability of the statement, rather than simply admitting
without challenging all manner of nontestimonial hearsay. For
example, if a particular clerk's office or database were known, or even
just suspected, to operate with high rates of error, the defendant could
present this argument to the court and possibly cross-examine the
records clerk in front of the jury. This possibility for cross-examination
exists because the Roberts Court emphasized, above all else, the need
for hearsay testimony to bear sufficient indicia of reliability. The
determinative issue for the Roberts Court was not whether the
testimony fit a hearsay exception, but whether the testimony was
sufficiently reliable. When there is some value to confrontation and
cross-examination, the defendant should have an opportunity to
convince the court to allow him to confront and cross-examine the
declarant. This provides some measure of ensuring that the
statements admitted under the hearsay exceptions continue to be
reliable, which is of course the underlying assumption of Roberts and
the hearsay rules.113
Additionally, this approach relies on an inquiry that is familiar
to courts, as Roberts was the touchstone Confrontation Clause opinion
for more than two decades. As such, courts are well equipped to decide
the reliability of nontestimonial hearsay based on the familiar inquiry
and the decades of precedent that the opinion generated.
The continued viability of Roberts, however, also depends on
some reconciliation between the Court and the many criticisms it
expressed in Crawford of the Roberts reliability approach. For
example, the Court criticized Roberts for the fact that the reliability
test was amorphous, overly subjective, and unpredictable, leading to
disparate results in similar cases due to the lack of solid standards in
determining the reliability of a hearsay statement.114 But the main
criticism that Crawford had for Roberts-that it allowed testimonial
hearsay to go without confrontation't 5-is not a concern here because
certificates of nonexistence of public record should be deemed
nontestimonial.
By applying the Roberts reliability test to certificates of
nonexistence of public record, there will be no need for confrontation
in the vast majority of cases. Confrontation will only be necessary
113. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
114. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64.
115. Id. at 63 ("The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its
unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.").
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when there are particular reasons to doubt the reliability of the clerk's
records or the clerk's process in searching the records.
An alternative solution would be to create a statutory
framework with a default presumption that the prosecution is allowed
to present its evidence through certification. There are at least two
possible versions of this statutory framework: so-called "burden-
shifting" statutes, and "notice-and-demand" statutes.116  Burden-
shifting statutes, as the name implies, shift the burden of subpoenaing
and examining the prosecution's witness from the prosecution to the
defense. Absent these actions by the defense, the prosecution can
present its evidence through certification. 117 Notice-and-demand
statutes require the prosecution to provide the defense with notice of
an intent to present evidence through certification. The defense then
can elect either to object and demand the witness's presence for trial
or to waive the right to confront the witness."18
Almost all states have, or until recently had, some version of
these types of statutes applicable in various trial contexts.119
Nevertheless, the continued constitutionality of these statutes is
suspect after Melendez-Diaz. For example, the Court in Melendez-Diaz
roundly criticized burden-shifting statutes:
[T1he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its
witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to
the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence
via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he
chooses.
1 2 0
Despite this seemingly clear language, the Court granted
certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia, only days after deciding Melendez-
Diaz, to review the constitutionality of Virginia's burden-shifting
statute.121 The Virginia statute required the prosecution to provide
116. See Gremillion, supra note 102, at 281-85 (discussing these various types of statutes
and their continued viability after Melendez-Diaz); see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 481-85 (2006) (discussing these kinds of statutes in the
specific context of forensic science certificates using similar terminology).
117. Gremillion, supra note 102, at 281-82.
118. Id. at 282-83.
119. See Metzger, supra note 116, at 478 & nn.9-10 (listing the forty-five jurisdictions with
and the six jurisdictions without such statutes in the context of forensic certificates).
120. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009). For further discussion of the criticisms of burden-shifting
statutes in the context of forensic evidence, see Metzger, supra note 116. For example, Metzger
criticizes these statutes for eviscerating the state's burden of presenting proof and "creat[ing]
'default waivers' of fundamental constitutional rights" that "convert the State's partisan
allegations into incontrovertible and unconstitutional presumptions." Id. at 481.
121. Briscoe v. Virginia, 657 S.E.2d 113, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009); see also




notice of an intent to use a certificate as evidence, but it also required
the defense to subpoena the witness if it desired confrontation,
thereby placing the burden of producing the witness on the defense. 122
Defendant Briscoe was convicted of drug trafficking charges based in
part on a certificate from the state's laboratory analyst confirming the
substance found in the defendant's possession was a narcotic.123 The
statute, of course, permitted the prosecution to introduce the
certificate as evidence, and the defendant raised the claim that this
violated his right to confrontation, especially after Melendez-Diaz.124
In response, the prosecution argued that the defendant waived his
confrontation right when he failed to respond to the prosecution's
notice that it would present the evidence through certificate, primarily
because he did not call the analyst as a witness during his own
presentation of proof. 25
In large part, the dispute in Briscoe boiled down to the question
of who has the burden of calling a witness that must be confronted in
court under Crawford's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
Briscoe argued that requiring the defense to call the prosecution's
witness upset a long-established trial practice, forcing the defense to
cross-examine a prosecution witness without knowing what he might
say and providing the prosecution an opportunity to interrogate a
friendly witness in the middle of the defense case.126 Furthermore, it
could allow a wide range of criminal trials through affidavits without
any live testimony.127 Virginia, and the many amici who supported her
position,128 contended that the Confrontation Clause only requires an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and the statute adequately
preserves that opportunity for the defendant, as there is no
constitutionally required order of proof in a criminal trial.129 The
Court, somewhat enigmatically after granting certiorari and hearing
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (2010); see also Brief of Petitioners, supra note 83, at 3;
Denniston, supra note 70 (discussing Virginia's statutory scheme).
123. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 83, at 4.
124. Id. at 3-4.
125. Brief of the Respondent at 13, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191).
126. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 83, at 8, 16-24.
127. Id. at 9.
128. The United States filed a brief supporting Virginia, Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-
11191), as did the states of Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia, Brief of the States of Indiana et.
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-
11191).
129. Brief of the Respondent, supra note 125, at 35-36.
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oral argument, issued a one-sentence per curiam opinion vacating the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision upholding the statute and
remanded the case for further proceedings "not inconsistent with the
opinion in Melendez-Diaz."130
Burden-shifting statutes, therefore, appear to be
unconstitutional as they pertain to testimonial evidence. Nevertheless,
if certificates of nonexistence of public record are deemed
nontestimonial, then burden-shifting statutes concerning such
evidence are possibly still a permissible solution because the
Confrontation Clause, according to the Crawford doctrine, only applies
to testimonial hearsay.131
Even assuming that burden-shifting statutes are constitutional
as they apply to nontestimonial evidence, some criticisms of this
approach are apparent. One is that this statutory arrangement forces
the defense to bear the practical aspects of the burden of calling a
witness whom it is not well suited to call. The defense is not likely as
intimately acquainted with the government's vast law enforcement
bureaucracy, so it is less capable than the prosecution of contacting, or
even knowing how to contact, particular government officials such as
records clerks. This problem could be easily ameliorated by requiring
the prosecution to provide the defense with the contact information of
those declarants whose affidavits and certified statements the
prosecution intends to use at trial. The disclosure of contact
information could occur either at the discovery stage or when the
prosecution submits its notification to the defense that it will be
relying on affidavits and certified statements rather than live
testimony.
Another criticism is that this approach requires the defense to
bear the monetary costs associated with calling the government
official to trial because the defense must pay for a prosecution witness
to testify. One remedy to this criticism is simply to require by statute
that the government pay these expenses if the defense wants to call
the government witness.132 But then again, the elimination of all the
barriers to calling the records clerk would leave no reason for the
130. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316 (2010). For a discussion of the confusion
surrounding the Court's action in Briscoe, see Lisa McElroy, The Last Two Days in Plain
English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 27, 2010 3:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/blog/2010/01/the-last-
two-days-in-plain-english].
131. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) ("It is the testimonial character of
the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations
upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.").
132. In fact, the Virginia statute at issue in Briscoe v. Virginia requires the government to do
just this. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (2010); Denniston, supra note 70.
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defense not to call the records clerk even when the defense has little
reason to do so. Essentially, this would open the possibility that
defense attorneys would strategically decide to call the records clerks
in all of their cases, perhaps in the hope of overwhelming the
government and its records clerks so that the clerks would not appear
in court for all the cases, especially the less important ones. Of course,
this strategic practice would lead to many of the practical problems
associated with the Melendez-Diaz dictum requiring confrontation of
records clerks in all cases.
Contrary to the Court's condemnation of burden-shifting
statutes, the Court condones notice-and-demand statutes. These
statutes, according to the Court, do not shift onto the defendant any
additional burden; the defendant always has the burden to object or
otherwise affirmatively assert the confrontation right.133 Notice-and-
demand statutes simply govern the time period in which the
defendant can permissibly assert this right and demand that the
prosecution call the witness at trial.134 Therefore, while burden-
shifting statutes appear to be unconstitutional after Melendez-Diaz
and Briscoe (at least as they pertain to testimonial hearsay), notice-
and-demand statutes are likely constitutional.
This kind of "notice-and-demand" statutory compromise
provides an effective solution to the problem of how best to deal with
borderline cases such as certificates of nonexistence of public record
under the testimonial standard. In fact, this could be a viable solution
even if certificates of nonexistence of public record are later deemed
testimonial, consistent with the Melendez-Diaz dictum and contrary to
this Note's argument. When the defendant finds sufficient value in
cross-examining the declarant of a certified statement, he can exercise
his right to confrontation by demanding the declarant's presence. This
prevents the inefficiencies that result from requiring live testimony in
every case and adequately preserves the defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him.
Just as in the case of burden-shifting statutes, however,
defendants could easily bypass this statutory attempt to avoid the
practical problems of the Melendez-Diaz dictum by always demanding
that the government's witness testify. Although the defense does not
incur any additional burden, the defense still has the opportunity to
make each trial more costly for the prosecution. For this reason, both
of these statutory schemes are inferior to an application of the Roberts
reliability test to nontestimonial evidence.
133. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
134. Id.
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All of these potential solutions-applying the Roberts
reliability test, creating a burden-shifting statutory framework (if
certificates of nonexistence of public record are classified as
nontestimonial), or creating a notice-and-demand statutory framework
that regulates the time period in which the defendant can assert the
confrontation right-are preferable to Melendez-Diaz's default
requirement of presenting live testimony instead of a certificate of
nonexistence of public record. These solutions allow the defendant to
weigh the value of confronting and cross-examining a records clerk,
and they minimize the amount of time government clerks spend in
courtrooms testifying in the thousands of cases annually that rely on
certificates of nonexistence of public record.
V. CONCLUSION
Crawford's modification of Confrontation Clause analysis has
changed much of how lower courts treat hearsay statements. It should
not, however, alter the treatment of certificates of nonexistence of
public record, despite Melendez-Diaz's assertion otherwise. These
certificates should not be considered testimonial. Under the
"testimonial" test, certificates of nonexistence of public record, while
made in preparation for trial, are distinguishable from other
testimonial statements because they are made on the basis of records
not kept for the purpose of trial. Essentially, they only restate an
assertion that the records themselves contain, much like a business
record would. Additionally, these records are similar to certified
authentications of public records, and the Court has not yet declared
those to be testimonial when there is no element of interpretation or
inference on the part of the declarant. Assessing the Melendez-Diaz
dictum according to the right of confrontation reveals that cross-
examination of the public records custodian who certifies that no
public record exists results in few of the benefits or safeguards that
undergird the Confrontation Clause, including (1) the provision to the
defendant of an ability to test the truth and accuracy of adverse
testimony, (2) the requirement that a witness be in the presence of the
defendant when he makes the statements, (3) the requirement that
the witness make the statements under oath, and (4) the provision to
the jury of an opportunity to observe the witness and assess his
trustworthiness.
Although certificates of nonexistence of public record should be
considered nontestimonial, there still should be some means of
ensuring their reliability and allowing the defendant an opportunity to
confront the record keeper in certain circumstances. Possible means of
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accommodating these interests include, first, continuing to apply the
Roberts reliability test to nontestimonial hearsay, and second, a
statutory compromise that allows the prosecution to present the
certificate at trial without confrontation unless the defendant desires
to confront the declarant. If the defendant does wish to confront the
declarant, under a statutory compromise, the defendant can call the
declarant as a defense witness (in the case of a burden-shifting
statute) or demand that the prosecution call him (in the case of a
notice-and-demand statute). Regardless of how courts accommodate
these interests, certificates of nonexistence of public record should be
classified as nontestimonial, despite the Melendez-Diaz dictum.
Classifying these certificates as nontestimonial best serves the
principles underlying the Confrontation Clause while still promoting
fairness in the courtroom and governmental efficiency.
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